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Abstract: The Indonesian government has used oil palm as a major tool of rural socio-economic 
improvement, doing this through ‘nucleus estates’ operated by estate companies and through 
assisting individual smallholdings. The initiatives have together raised the incomes of more than 
500,000 farmers, and may be judged successful market interventions which are far superior to 
laissez faire.  But although the average economic and social performances of both initiatives have 
been reasonable, their outcomes have been variable. The nucleus estates have sometimes suffered 
from faulty management, bad community rapport, difficult land conversions, and the mistakes of 
government agencies and settler cooperatives. They were also discontinued in 2001, due to scarce 
finance. The assistance to individual smallholdings has always had short funding, limiting its 
scope. Both initiatives were commenced under the New Order, and face new challenges in the 
present era of democracy and otonomi daerah.  The analysis of this paper nonetheless shows that 
these Indonesian interventions should be continued, albeit with more capital being provided and 
their deficiencies being remedied. It denotes that the interventions compare well with official 
efforts in other countries, strengthening the general case for public action to assist poor rural 
dwellers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Indonesian state has for three decades used oil palm as a major vehicle of rural socio-
economic improvement, notably by promoting smallholding oil palm through nucleus 
estates and by assisting individual farmers. It has followed a model of market 
intervention, which, in the 1970s and 1980s especially, was heavily criticized as an 
approach to assisting small cultivators. This was particularly in light of what was seen as 
a dismal record in Africa, where subsidies, taxation, regulatory controls, and direct public 
participation in the production and handling of agricultural commodities including oil 
palm were widely employed in the post-colonial era (Bauer 1976; Hyden 1980, Bates 
1981). Such interventions were assessed as costly, and as largely failing to meet their 
social and political objectives. They were also regarded as undermining market 
efficiency, monopolizing scarce technical skills and other resources, bolstering and 
protecting powerful classes, and producing serious long-run distortions which often led to 
economic disruption. The critics of intervention argued that ‘a government which governs 
best is that which interferes least’, and that a laissez faire approach is far more effective. 
These criticisms were accepted by many practitioners of rural development, especially 
the multilateral development banks (World Bank 1981). Hence, previous interventions in 
African states were largely dismantled in the 1980s (World Bank 1999). 
 
But in rural Asia, market intervention for social purposes was maintained, and indeed 
augmented, by governments more independent of the international practitioners. Thus 
Fletcher (1991) showed how with oil palm from the 1960s, the Malaysian state, through 
the Federal Land Development Authority, successfully promoted the interests of its 
poorer citizens, while at the same time securing the growth and international 
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competitiveness of the sector. The role of the Authority, a parastatal agency run by 
specially appointed staff, was mainly in organizing, on the basis of smallholdings, the 
production, processing, downstream manufacture and international marketing of what, by 
the 2000s, had become one fifth of Malaysia’s total palm oil crop. In doing this, big 
increases in incomes were provided to over 300,000 families and one and a half million 
people. Manifestly, there were difficulties, particularly in later years when the 
smallholder areas under the Authority had to be converted to an essentially estate basis 
following the ageing of original settlers and migration of most young people to urban 
areas. Yet, this did not negate what had been a major achievement, and adjusted the 
gigantic enterprise towards better sustainability. 
 
Barlow (1997 and 2001) also reviewed government interventions in plantation 
development in the global context. He concluded that ‘micro-interventions’, comprising 
both provision of infrastructure and services, and ‘targeted’ programs, including credit, 
extension and research, were often profitable and usefully overcame incomplete markets 
for credit and information. On the other hand, ‘macro-interventions’, comprising the 
exchange rate, trade and price administration measures, were almost exclusively 
damaging and ineffective. Respecting the latter, the far more open Malaysian and Thai 
regimes stood out as assisting development more adequately than what were, up to the 
mid-1990s,  the inward-looking macro policies of India and, to some extent, of China.  
 
This paper focuses on Indonesian socio-economic improvement through oil palm, 
scrutinizing targeted micro-interventions entailing the promotion of smallholdings by 
means of ‘nucleus estates’ and the betterment of individual farms. The circumstances of 
Indonesian oil palm were recently analyzed by Barlow, Zen and Gondowarsito (2005), 
basing their work on a recent field ‘Study’ of production and processing. These authors 
scrutinized the estates, smallholdings and associated institutions in this large industry 
now covering over 4.9 million hectares of oil palm (Table 1). Further background 
information is given by PT Capricorn Indonesia Consult, Inc. (2004). The industry has 
expanded in area by 12.0% per year over the last decade, and engages the efforts of 1.7 
million labourers and small farmers. Its geographical distribution is shown in Figure 1.  
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 It is noteworthy that Indonesia’s efforts to use plantations in socio-economic 
improvement were preceded in the late 1960s and 1970s by vast government programs of 
assisting small farm rice and palawidja cultivation, especially in Java. It was only from 
the late 1970s that sustained efforts began to be made with tree crops, partly as a means 
of developing previously neglected regions of the outer islands, and partly as a way of 
‘rescuing’ the by then huge transmigration settlements which had often failed due to their 
reliance on rice and subsistence crops.   
 
It is also important to remember in examining Indonesian policies, and especially in 
making international comparisons, that the reigning political paradigms and regional 
geographies significantly affect outcomes. Thus, a system working well under the 
Malaysian conditions of a centralized and powerful government, and relatively uniform 
geography, may be less suitable in Indonesia. There any system must cope with 
decentralized political control, a broadly more democratic situation, and enormous 
sprawling and climatically divergent locations in Sumatra, Kalimantan and other islands. 
 
The paper now examines both the nucleus estates and the efforts to better individual 
farms. The institutional arrangements of these initiatives are checked, and their economic 
and social outcomes are examined. Conclusions are finally presented, and the global 
significance of the Indonesian experience is reviewed.   
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2. GOVERNMENT AND OTHER MEASURES OF IMPROVEMENT 
 
The Indonesian initiatives based on oil palm and other tree crops have been adopted 
against a background of widespread poverty in the outer islands, where a large, very poor 
and technically uninformed rural population lives side by side with a prosperous 
commercial estate plantation sector. While many small farmers in these regions are 
cultivating trees including oil palm as a spread effect from estates, their stands are usually 
low-yielding and land-extensive providing low returns, and this, taken with shifting 
cultivation of food crops, puts great pressure on forest resources in an environment 
already diminished through timber extraction (Potter and Lee 1998). Although a few 
farmers have made autonomous transitions to high-yielding varieties and secured major 
income increases, these have been mainly staff and workers from estates along with some 
well-endowed local businesspersons. Relatively few ordinary farmers have taken such 
action, and it may thus be seen as necessary for government or a civil society 
organization to intervene to secure such change. The government has been the main 
entity concerned with smallholding plantation crops in Indonesia, and this paper 
accordingly concentrates on interventions made by it. 
 
Some regions of the outer islands suffer especially severe poverty and environmental 
problems, needing enhanced attention to secure more appropriately balanced regional 
development. These regions include southern Sumatra, and eastern, western and central 
Kalimantan. The Kalimantan locations, in particular, have frequently been covered by 
large areas of the creeping and economically useless grass, alang2 or Imperata 
cylindrica, which is the legacy of deforestation by timber companies and illegal loggers, 
or of clearing for food crop cultivation in transmigration schemes. The frequent burning 
during the dry season of both alang2 and unutilizable timber has posed additional 
environmental hazards through smoke and haze, and these have damaged health in places 
concerned. The government under these circumstances has been keen to issue titles or 
hak guna usaha without substantial payment by developers, so as to secure the better 
option of oil palm cultivation.   
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The need under these circumstances is to introduce socio-economic improvements which 
match local resources and climatic endowments, and which can be adopted sustainably 
and profitably by local farmers and transmigrants. The yield-increasing nature of the 
improvements then enables the goal of reducing pressures on the limited land to be 
realized. It is vital too from a national viewpoint, and a critical additional justification, 
that the improvements generate a higher national income and foreign exchange. The main 
focus in the early years of official smallholder plantation improvement was on rubber, 
which was already well known to local people, cultivated in low-yielding mode over vast 
areas, and marketed through a competitive chain of traders. The improvements of those 
years could be built on an existing base, which was somewhat easier than starting with a 
fresh crop. But from the mid 1980s, the revenue-earning superiority of oil palm over 
rubber became clear, and the chief thrust of new initiatives has since focused on the 
former.  
 
The principal constraints on improvement have always included the scarcity of 
development capital, although this was not acute until the 1997 financial crisis. More 
immediately significant has been the shortage of skilled personnel to implement the 
changes thought appropriate, where the tree crop extension services or Dinas Perkebunan 
have lacked adequate staff and been perennially underfunded. The staffing difficulty was, 
nevertheless, overcome with the rubber improvement schemes of the 1970s and early 
1980s, which were largely implemented by the Smallholders’ Rubber Development 
Program, funded in part by the World Bank and progressively built into a most effective 
operation (Zen, 1997). This was a separate venture alongside the traditional tree crop 
extension, and engineered the bulk of new initiatives over those years. 
 
But when interest grew in oil palm, the vast size of envisaged improvements, taken with 
the need to have large palm oil mills for the necessary economies of scale, meant that 
attention turned to seeking help from the government and private estates. These entities 
had high managerial and technical skills, huge palm oil mills, and ready access to capital. 
The ‘nucleus estate’ model, which was pioneered in Africa in the 1950s by the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation and had come to be widely employed on that 
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continent (Graham and Floering 1984), was adopted by the Indonesian authorities, and 
from the late 1970s to 2000 came to involve large areas of oil palm.  
 
When the nucleus estate program commenced, Indonesia was still in the highly 
centralized and authoritative mode of the New Order government. But, since 1999, this 
has been superseded, first by the newly important influence of local legislatures and then 
after 2001 by the decentralization arrangements of otonomi daerah. The increase in 
influence of local politicians and the placing of most of the administrative and financial 
power in the hands of kabupaten have importantly influenced socio-economic initiatives, 
not only through the nucleus estates but also through the extension by the Dinas 
Perkebunan. These changes have certainly had benefits, but also posed new constraints. 
The financial problems from 1997 additionally occasioned a slowing of the nucleus 
estates, and, in fact, there has been no further government-sponsored expansion of these 
units since 2001. But several private estate companies have continued to establish such 
estates with their own resources, partly as a means of getting hold of more land for their 
commercial operations. 
 
There have as well since 1998 been widespread disputes over ownership of land, 
including areas already provided to settler-smallholders within nucleus estate schemes. 
While the forced alienation of land for nucleus and commercial estate purposes was 
largely unopposed during the New Order, original landowners operating in a more 
democratic paradigm have seen the original virtual seizure of their lands as an act to be 
vigorously contested. These conflicts are also exacerbated by a growing land scarcity, 
where the traditional shifting cultivation of largely subsistence crops is becoming 
increasingly difficult to maintain and inevitably generates tensions.  
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Routes to Improvement 
 
There is, in the mid-2000s, a big Indonesian debate over the direction for socio-economic 
improvement through oil palm and other plantations. While earlier initiatives certainly 
had positive impacts, rural poverty is still widespread, and growing more oil palm in 
targeted schemes can overcome it further. The two chief routes for the future are still 
through more development of nucleus estates, and through more of the longer-standing 
approach of improving traditional individual smallholdings. These routes and their past 
performances are now examined in more detail, prior to considering how they might be 
developed in coming years.   
 
(i) Nucleus Estates 
 
The basic thrust of nucleus estates is to provide, for the purpose of smallholder 
development, a ‘package’ comprising management, technology including high-yielding 
trees, and services entailing the opening and planting of land, the supply of inputs, and 
processing. This package is made available from a commercial nucleus or inti to a 
surrounding plasma of smallholdings in 2-3 ha units. The government from the late 1970s 
put pressure on estates to undertake such plasma development, in return giving them 
access to land for inti and providing subsidized capital for inti and plasma development.  
 
A total of almost 900,000 ha of smallholder plasma were established on nucleus estates 
up to 2003 (Table 1), involving 400,000 settlers and almost 2 million people in the 
families concerned. The proportion of inti in the total nucleus estate area was 20% for 
many years, but rose after 1998 to 40%, reducing the estate risk and enhancing 
economies of scale. The usual arrangement was for estates to clear the plasma land, plant 
the tree crop, and administer the development for four years, during which time some 
employment was offered to the settler-smallholders. Then administration was transferred 
to an elected settler cooperative, which normally contracted the estate to continue the 
functions of management, extension and provision of services. The cooperative handled 
the repayment of plasma development loans, with 30 % of the net crop proceeds being 
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deducted to cover the subsidized interest of 12% and charges for inputs and services. The 
estates benefited through their fees for services, and through their returns from milling 
smallholder fruits into crude palm oil.  
 
Five types of nucleus estate were established from the beginning in 1978, as described in 
Table 2. While the first PIR Lokal only provided for surrounding farmers, subsequent 
types catered for both transmigrants and locals, with the former who often came from 
failed local cash crop schemes normally being given priority. One problem persisting 
from the start, and never properly rectified, was that of producing enough subsistence 
over the four years until the oil palm started producing. Although the settlers were 
sometimes employed by the estates, notably in opening and planting the plasma land, this 
did not generally provide them with sufficient income. Settlers were also not permitted to 
inter-crop their young oil palm stands, where this could have substantially supplemented 
their returns The prices paid for their crops of ‘fresh fruit bunches’ (FFB) were further 
not high enough over the first two decades, and this was only improved from 1997 when 
the official ‘formula’ for this purpose was altered. Again, the 2.0 hectares of oil palm per 
settler were really not sufficient to generate a reasonable income, especially in the early 
lower-yielding years. But after 1997 participants were allowed to plant oil palm on their 
additional ‘cash crop’ area of 1.0 hectare, and they universally took advantage of this.    
 
The settlers’ situations usually improved greatly when their palms came into full 
production after 9-10 years, which was also a stage when they were normally able to 
complete both their principal and interest repayments. Although there were exceptions, 
most of the farmers in plasma areas established up to the mid-1990s were doing well by 
the mid-2000s, although there was the usual variable performance characteristic of small 
farm agriculture. There were also big differences between separate nucleus estate 
schemes.   
 
Thus relating to estate differences, the competence of management of sponsoring estates 
was a key influence on performance, affecting the original ‘conversions’ of land, the 
quality of palms and cultivation, the standard of product, the handling of settlers, and 
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relations with cooperatives and other parties including local governments and 
transmigration officials. For estate managements previously geared to profitably running 
commercial units, it was a new ball game to enter the realm of socio-economic 
improvement, with a continuing temptation and tendency to emphasize the core inti, 
which was after all the ‘profit core’ of their operation. The situation was further 
complicated from the late 1990s by the major political changes, which impinged on the 
relations of estates with the local communities. The frequently domineering attitudes of 
managements made it hard for them to solve the serious land problems that arose with the 
original owners, especially when transfers had not been properly documented during the 
New Order (Sulaiman 2000).  
 
Hence estates had frequently not properly checked the ownership of each of the many 
hundreds of individual parcels comprising a proposed plasma area of several thousand 
hectares, although to avoid claims under the changed political conditions it was necessary 
to do so and secure the individual agreements to transfers. This omission released the 
potential for prolonged disputes. A related dilemma was the contention of some local 
settlers that they were entitled to more land than the norm, because they had contributed 
big areas to the schemes. Indeed, certain locals contributed their land to the nucleus 
estates, but were not later included in the plasma. It was observed in the Study that these 
difficulties often led to the freezing of large blocks, including those in existing plasma, 
disrupting operations for long and sometimes indefinite periods. 
 
There were also common misunderstandings between estate managements and local 
governments, which became more serious as power was devolved from the centre to the 
kabupaten. A generation of managements used to ignoring local officials took time to 
realize they now needed good rapport with these people, who could otherwise make it 
very difficult for them. In one recent case in the Study, the bupati blockaded for several 
months the main access road into a big nucleus estate, making it hard to export its 
produce until the estate agreed to defer on a particular issue.  
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Some managements were incompetent even at running normal commercial operations, 
and this carried over into the plasma where such aspects as wage payments to workers 
were delayed and lower than agreed. In a further Study case of complete ineptitude, 
furious settlers took over the estate offices and ran the operation themselves. In another 
case, only 200 hectares of a 500 hectare plasma had been poorly developed after several 
years, since the technically competent estate management was unable to establish 
workable relations with the local settler groups.  
 
The transfer to settlers of the requisite skills also proved difficult, especially with people 
having non-agricultural backgrounds. Often it took many years for such settlers to 
competently handle their areas, especially with harvesting and other operations that 
required much expertise. When managements used to dealing with hired workers ignored 
this training problem, the results were inevitably poor, but where proper and sympathetic 
extension was instituted the results were often very good, increasing net returns for all 
concerned. Indeed, many estate companies adjusted well following earlier setbacks, 
managing to achieve excellent results.  
 
Hence in a further instance in the Study, a big company engaging in numerous nucleus 
estates set up a special section to deal with settler extension and community relations, 
concentrating on the 20-30% of participants with particular difficulties. This company, 
whose commercial results were already excellent, secured much better than average 
settler performances and cordial relations, raising both its and the settlers’ earnings. This 
was still within the framework of general discipline and toughness necessary in such big 
operations. It is in fact noticeable that commercial companies have generally performed 
better than government estates in the nucleus estates program. They are more imaginative 
and flexible in management, and their observance of the ‘bottom line’ has served to 
promote more effective settler management.  
 
The estates were not the only parties affecting outcomes, however, and troubles also 
arose from unsuitable settlers selected by the Department of Transmigration and 
Manpower. Such settlers often failed completely, and eventually dropped out of the 
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schemes. Again, the Bank Indonesia was frequently slow in its disbursements to the 
commercial banks which managed the loans, while the latter banks co-ordinated poorly 
with both the Department and estate companies. This led to delays of months or even 
years in land clearing and planting, incurring higher expenditures in the interim to 
support plasma farmers. Cooperatives on occasion functioned poorly, especially in earlier 
years when those responsible had to engage in a massive learning process, and corruption 
amongst the elected officials led to losses of settlers’ money. But these complications 
were again often surmounted, especially under pressures from an increasingly 
knowledgeable and vociferous membership and in a process where co-operatives adjusted 
towards better administration.   
 
Despite these problems of nucleus estates, however, estimates based on the Study, and 
using currently forecast prices, indicate quite reasonable average outcomes (Tables 3 and 
4). The estimated mean internal rate of return (IRR) of plasma over the 28 years involved 
is 15 per cent, after deduction of land charges which in practice do not always apply. This 
compares with an estimate of 18% after land charges for purely commercial estates. A 
good part of the substantial net return per kg of the plasma (Table 3) flows back to the 
settlers, adding to the ‘wage’ of Rp21.000 per day paid for harvesting and other manual 
inputs.  
 
Yet these results subsume considerable differences between settlers, with a check in the 
Study of individual farmer’s record books showing a variation of at least 50% around 
mean plasma yields. Again, some nucleus estate plasma as a whole, and notably those 
making the positive adjustments just discussed, did much better than average. But even 
most of the worst performing entities have survived, although the returns per settler have 
been much lower.  
 
In an overall assessment, the nucleus estates may be judged a moderate success, despite 
the problems demanding solutions if the route is to be further developed. Desirable 
adjustments are explored in the conclusions. 
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 (ii) Improvement of Individual Smallholdings 
 
A majority of the current area of Indonesian individual oil palm smallholdings is planted 
with low-yielding palms, whose estimated average annual yield of FFB is only 10.0 
tonnes per ha compared to the 21.3 tonnes on estates (Table 3). The smallholding palms 
are generally purchased from little private nurseries or travelling traders, whose low 
prices per seedling of Rp4.000 appeal to farmers short of cash and needing to establish 
around 120 palms per hectare. The farmers’ lack of technical knowledge also makes it 
hard for them to distinguish between such poor materials and the more than twice as 
expensive high-yielding trees sold by a few big nurseries also hard to access and hence 
imposing additional transactions costs. These inferior palms are often planted 
haphazardly without terracing, and fertilizer applications are low. But the fact that those 
involved are usually local people means they can access land without the substantial 
charges often applying to estates and other outsiders. They accordingly secure an 
estimated IRR (without land costs) of 19% (Table 4), but their lesser outputs mean they 
obtain only half the estimated net present value of the plasma holdings. The economic 
attraction of such smallholder oil palm is nonetheless attested to by its rapid expansion of 
over 15% per year for the last 13 years (Table 1). 
 
While most such traditional smallholders have not been in contact with plantation 
extension officers, the limited operations of the Dinas Perkebunan with individual 
smallholdings since the 1960s have in fact had positive impacts, notably through the 
distribution of high-yielding materials by reputable nurseries. This was illustrated for 
rubber by Barlow and Muharminto (1982) and Zen (1997), who observed how a small 
proportion of smallholders had been thereby enabled to plant better trees, and how this 
and improved husbandry led to doubled yields over the 20-year life of the stands. Similar 
efforts have continued more recently with oil palm, with an especially promising joint 
initiative in several locations in the 2000s between the Indonesian Oil Palm Research 
Institute (IOPRI), the local Dinas Perkebunan, and local estate companies. The 
companies have set up large nurseries selling improved seedlings at subsidized prices, 
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with an accompanying extension program implemented by the Dinas and seeing 
widespread tree adoption in each case. 
 
But these initiatives have like the nucleus estates again been affected by the recent 
political changes, notably by the decentralization in which the local Dinas are now almost 
exclusively under the control and financial jurisdiction of kabupaten showing varying 
degrees of interest in rural improvement. Sometimes, and especially in the richer 
provinces including Riau and East Kalimantan, the programs of the Dinas have been 
strongly bolstered, and assisted further by special subsidized loans. In other instances, 
however, the Dinas are even more constrained than they were under the New Order, 
where they were at least assured of a minimal level of finance.   
 
There has, nonetheless, been a considerable advance of smallholder high-yielding oil 
palm, although part of this is due to the autonomous actors already noted.  Often the areas 
planted by these actors are quite large by smallholding standards, approaching 10-20 ha. 
But there are also more traditional smallholders, frequently pendatang from other parts of 
Indonesia, planting such better materials on their 2-3 hectares, where they were impelled 
to do this by both the Dinas and their bigger more knowledgeable smallholder 
neighbours. Their estimated average yields were reasonable at an estimated 17.0 tonnes 
per hectare (Table 3), and with labour and other costs being lower than those of estates 
they managed a mean IRR of 18% after land charges, with a quite substantial net present 
value (Table 4). 
 
Those who have established high-yielding trees on independent smallholdings can 
accordingly be judged as having secured useful increases in income, and if this approach 
can be extended to more traditional smallholders it will mark a significant advance. It is 
hard to estimate the current extent of such improved holdings, but it probably does not 
exceed 250,000 hectares in the total of over 900,000 hectares of individual oil palm 
holdings (Table 1). There is accordingly much further improvement to be made. In many 
ways advances through small independent smallholdings are more flexible than those 
through the comprehensive package and careful control entailed with nucleus estates. In 
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addition, they certainly involve a far lower official investment in terms of the government 
finance needed to support their establishment (Table 3), and this is most advantageous in 
the circumstances of scarce development capital. They are also more appropriate to the 
new Indonesian era of devolution and greater individual independence. Suggestions as to 
how this approach might be made more effective are included in the conclusions.  
 
One aspect not yet mentioned in relation to both nucleus estate and individual 
smallholding operations are the substantial spread effects which they generate. These 
effects basically stem from the training, and encouragement to plant elsewhere, of 
persons involved, where the Study showed that numerous plasma settlers had planted 
high-yielding trees on land outside the nucleus estates, while some individual 
smallholdiers who had planted high-yielding material had subsequently decided to extend 
their operations. A further and more minor effect springs from demonstration, where 
progressive surrounding farmers observe the improvements made by their colleagues, 
consult them, and themselves plant high-yielding stands. There are always considerable 
lags in such dissemination of innovations, however, first in the learning process, and then 
in the time needed to amass sufficient capital to take action. But these spread effects 
should certainly be taken into account in assessing the final results of socio-economic 
improvements like those described.    
 
(iii) Other Initiatives 
Other players beside government have attempted the socio-economic improvement of 
rural populations, and three initiatives of big commercial companies, which were 
scrutinized in the Study, are now explored. But other schemes have also been launched 
by business and civil society organizations.   
 
One venture was by a medium-sized estate company in Sumatra, which, with advice from 
IOPRI and the official livestock extension service, commenced in 1996 a scheme for 
distributing cattle to its 500 employees. The company negotiated and then administered a 
7-year loan from the Bank Rakyat Indonesia, which enabled the distribution of three 
animals to each employee family. The beasts were grazed under the oil palm, with 
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supplementary feeding on oil palm waste and kernel cake. These animals were used for 
breeding and fattening, and as well as for transporting harvested FFB. By 2003 the 
number of cattle in the scheme had doubled, while the area harvested per worker had 
risen from 10 to 15 ha and the incomes of those concerned had been commensurately 
increased. The scheme was well managed by the estate staff, which also sought outside 
professional advice on health and feeding regimes. It was featured too by excellent 
continuing relations with the communities involved, and may up to now be judged an 
outstanding success. 
 
Another recent venture undertaken by a large commercial estate company, under pressure 
from the local community and government and following both the failure of a plasma 
enterprise and retaliatory destruction of estate facilities by dissatisfied local residents, 
was the establishment of 20 ha ‘community oil palm areas’, one beside each of 26 
villages. The basic problem in this case was that while the company established and 
subsequently managed the areas at a high technical level, it barely liaised with the local 
communities, so that the latter were hardly involved. They thus learned little, which was 
ironical as the areas would eventually be handed to them to manage. This venture was 
scrutinized by Zen et al (2005), who explored the underlying issues and suggested ways 
in which the approach could be amended. The latter notably involved a higher extension 
effort, far more local participation, and the promotion of better relations with villagers 
concerned.  
 
The third initiative was the modification by a very large company with several nucleus 
estates of the established mode of operation. In this ‘Pola Patungan’ approach, the 
settlers did not receive their own two hectare blocks when the oil palm matured after four 
years, but were instead given share certificates for 2 hectares. They then had the choice of 
working in the plasma area under the cooperative, which had been carefully trained by 
the company in management and administration, or of becoming regular employees in the 
estate inti workforce. Although this change, which was financed by the company, was 
chiefly made to avoid settler-company and settler-settler conflicts over the inevitably 
variable quality of individual blocks, it also enabled a higher operating efficiency to be 
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secured. It was noticed in the Study that the yields were high, and that most settlers not 
only improved their original houses but also had satellite dishes and motor cycles. An 
interesting comparison may be made here with the Felda scheme in Malaysia, where the 
‘share system’ was subsequently adopted to both handle the problem of ageing settlers 
and again obtain better efficiency. The difficulty with individual smallholder operation is 
always the variability in individual performance, and, with some notable exceptions, 
conversion to the more highly technical and rigorous general management is likely to 
improve efficiency.    
 
These three examples all demonstrate the importance of intervenors designing initiatives 
which match the systems of workers and smallholders they are attempting to assist. It is 
notable too that the very success of the first and third initiatives, and the benefit conferred 
on participants, also much enhanced the profitability of the companies and rendered the 
whole affair mutually beneficial. In contrast, the difficulties with the second initiative 
have since led to a further souring of relations, and the recent killing by the villagers of 
some staff from the commercial enterprise concerned. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This review of oil palm as a vehicle of socio-economic improvement has indicated the 
moderate success of the Indonesian government’s nucleus estate program, while also 
highlighting the difficulties in implementation. It has likewise denoted a reasonable 
outcome in establishing high-yielding individual oil palm smallholdings, although this 
effort was partly due to private agents who had benefited from experiences on nucleus 
estates. Both programs secured major increases in living standards of the participants, 
along with considerable output rises, and there were in addition considerable spread 
effects. The programs may thus be seen as well justified in economic and social terms, 
especially as commercial estates under the previous laissez faire had merely stimulated 
the planting by smallholders of low-yielding trees, with little movement to higher 
technical levels. These oil palm programs are amongst many official actions to assist 
 16
rural improvement, using the outstanding economic performance of a particular crop as a 
means of extending prosperity. 
 
The programs discussed here are ‘targeted micro- interventions’, attempting to overcome 
incomplete markets for credit and information. The nucleus estates interestingly involved 
harnessing commercial expertise toward socio-economic goals, it being notable that 
private estates often managed more effectively than their public counterparts, adjusting to 
the new task and simultaneously increasing commercial returns. The assistance to 
individual smallholders worked well on its restricted scale, and dovetailed effectively 
with the efforts of progressive farmers. The scarce technical skills and other resources 
committed to these two programs secured estimated average returns to investment little 
different to those on commercial estates, and occurred within an expanding and 
competitive industry which consequently distributed its wealth to many more people. 
Indeed, recent Indonesian domestic pressures for greater equity, and the disastrous 
consequences for estates ignoring this, mean there is little alternative to organizing 
further such programs. They contrast strikingly with the Indonesian official oil palm 
‘macro-interventions’, notably with export taxes, which were broadly unsuccessful 
(Marks, Larson and Pomeroy 1998). 
 
Recommendations for the Future 
 
It is judged that both oil palm nucleus estates and the improvement of individual oil palm 
holdings should be strongly continued, following appropriate adjustments. For nucleus 
estates, adequate capital should be provided, but with no further subsidization of interest 
under the expectation of further rate declines. The inter-cropping of oil palm should be 
permitted during immaturity, with additional guidance to settlers in cash cropping and 
marketing, and with cattle and other high-value items being included. These changes 
should raise participant incomes during the critical early years. Training courses should 
be given to help the nucleus estate staff better transfer their technologies, deal more 
effectively with land transfers and sustain good community relations. There should 
likewise be more guidance and monitoring in the running of cooperatives. Interest and 
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loan repayments should be made more flexible, with lower deductions during years of 
smaller yields.  
 
The approach to individual smallholdings also requires adequate finance, which might be 
provided from the centre in a special fund, enabling less well-endowed provinces to 
parallel the efforts in Riau and North Sumatra. The emphasis of this much less expensive 
program should be on nurseries providing reputable high-yielding planting materials, 
whose price might be subsidized to stimulate adoption. This initiative should be backed 
by technical advice through local extension centres. It is tragic that over half the 
individual smallholder plantings in the 2000s are still being made with inferior low-
yielding trees, and it is crucial to check this practice which almost halves subsequent oil 
palm outputs for over 25 years.    
 
The Indonesian socio-economic thrusts with oil palm stand out globally as major tree 
crop interventions. While they have been more constrained in capital and skills than the 
earlier efforts of the Malaysian Federal Land Development Authority, the use of nucleus 
estates in conjunction with the commercial sector has helped overcome this. Although the 
extension of high-yielding varieties to individual smallholdings has also been less well 
endowed than similar efforts in Malaysia, Thailand or India, it has shown that reasonable 
results can be secured on a smaller budget. Certainly the situation in areas improved by 
official initiatives in all countries engaging in official interventions is far better than 
under laissez faire, and the disastrous effects of withdrawing the admittedly badly flawed 
previous initiatives in West Africa are demonstrated by the almost complete absence of 
further improvement in the smallholder scene there. Government and other intervenors 
are undoubtedly crucial in helping to secure socio-economic improvement through tree 
crops, and the challenge is to make these initiatives even more effective.     
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Table 1. Areas (‘000 ha), Annual Area Growth Rates (%) and Production (‘000 tonnes) 
of Oil Palm, 1980-2003 
 
Year Govt. Estates Private Estates Smallholdings Total 
1980 200 
(499) a
89 
(222) 
6 
(1) 
295 
(721) 
1990 372 
[6.4] b(1,247) 
463 
[18.0](789) 
291
[28.1](377) 
1.127 
[14.5](2,413) 
2003 561 
[3.2](1,716) 
2,555 
[14.0](4,778) 
1,811c 
[15.1](3,257) 
4,926 
[12.0](9,750) 
      Source: Direktorat Jenderal Bina Produksi Perkebunan (2004)  
      a   Figures in parentheses are ‘000t of production. 
      b   Figures in brackets are annual compound area growth rates, %, 1980-1990 and 
1990-2003. 
          c   Including 897,457 ha in nucleus estate plasma, and a balance of over 900,000 ha 
of individual holdings. 
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Table 2. Types of Nucleus Estate 
 
 
Type Main Features Performances 
A). PIR Lokal, 
from 19787 
On government estates 
only. Solely for local 
farmers surrounding 
estates. Each settler 
allocated 2.0 ha of oil 
palm, with all settler 
land in both PIR Lokal 
and in (B) through (E) 
being given by the local 
farmers in return for 
their inclusion. 
Not good. Major problems with failed 
subsistence food crops and consequent 
lack of food during 4-year immaturity, 
with lack of other incomes in the remote 
areas involved . The allocated 2.0 ha of 
oil palm also gave insufficient income, 
especially as government set too low a 
price for FFB and stipulated a 30% 
deduction from this. Many settlers 
abandoned their lands, selling them to 
rich traders, etc.  
B). Assisted 
PIR, from 
1984 
On government & 
private estates, partly 
funded by WB & ADB. 
Priority (1) for locals & 
(2)  for transmigrants, 
some of whom were 
from failed schemes 
whose land now became 
available. Each settler 
with 2.0 ha oil palm and 
1.0 ha food crops, incl. 
house area. Schools, 
health centres, markets, 
roads, etc also provided. 
Reasonable. Problems again with failed 
food crops and lack of other incomes. 
But fewer settlers left the plasma, and 
the situation once trees began to produce 
incomes was better for participants, 
especially following government’s 
upward revision of the price from 1987. 
But there were still difficulties owing to 
the 30% deductions up to the time of 
loan repayments. From 1997 following 
rules relaxation settlers also planted 1.0 
ha food crop areas with oil palm, and 
this together with higher yields after 
trees were 9-10 years old and other 
outside activities were started much 
improved their incomes and enabled 
loans to be finally repaid. 
C). Special 
PIR, from 
1984 
On government and 
private estates, funded 
by Indonesian govern-
ment. Priority (1) for 
transmigrants & (2) for 
locals. Areas and other 
facilities as under (B), 
but 35m2 added for 
housing.   
Reasonable. But transmigrants 
especially had problems with failed food 
crops, since land was not suitable for 
these. Other conditions, and 
improvements post-1997, were similar 
to those of (B). 
D).Accelerated 
PIR, from 
1984 
On government and 
private estates, funded 
by Indonesian govern-
ment. For transmigrants 
only. Areas and other 
Reasonable. Still severe problems with 
food crops. Other conditions and 
improvements post-1997, were similar 
to those of (B) and (C).  
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facilities as under (B) & 
(C). 
E). PIR Trans 
& KKPA, 
from 1986,  
replacing (B), 
(C) & (D).   
On government & 
private estates, funded 
by Indonesian govern-
ment, but with interest 
on KKPA loans later 
raised to 16% without 
further subsidy. For both 
transmigrants & locals, 
land from the latter being 
included in the scheme. 
Reasonable, similar to (B), (C) & (D).   
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Table 3. Expected Prices, Yields and Costs 
 
  
Estates 
Plasma 
s/holding 
High-yielding 
s/holding 
Low-yielding 
s/holding 
Factory-gate Price 
(Rp/kg FFBa) 
 
 
600 
 
 
573 
 
 
495 
 
 
441 
Yield of FFB (t/ha)  
21.3 
 
19.0 
 
17.0 
 
10.0 
Interest Rate (%)  
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
Wage (Rp/day) 21.000 21.000 18.900 18.900 
Harvesting Cost 
(Rp/kg FFB)b
 
60 
 
60 
 
54 
 
54 
Overheads (Rp/kg 
FFB) 
 
19.8 
 
18.9 
 
5.4c
 
2.7c
Capital(Rp/kg FFB)d  
9.0 
 
10.1 
 
8.8 
 
1.7 
Land (Rp/kg FFB)e  
28.2 
 
31.6 
 
35.3 
 
50.0 
Total Costf (Rp/kg 
FFB) 
 
289.4 
 
299.8 
 
265.3 
 
290.6 
Net Returng (Rp/kg 
FFB) 
 
310.6 
 
273.2 
 
229.7 
 
150.4 
Official Investment 
Cost (‘000 Rp/ha)h 
 
- 
 
19.019 
 
1.300 
 
- 
   Source: Data secured in the Group’s Indonesian oil palm study, 2002-2005. 
a. Fresh Fruit Bunches 
b.  All-in, including value of housing and all perquisites provided to workers. 
c. Assuming that the overheads of high and low-yielding smallholdings are 30 and 
50% respectively of those on estates and plasma holdings. 
d. Charge for interest on working capital in the enterprise. 
e. Charge for interest on the value of land. 
f. Including Upkeep, Fertilizer, Harvesting, Overheads, Capital, and Land (but not 
expenditures on any services provided by government departments including the 
Dinas Perkebunan and Biro Transmigrasi). 
g. Factory-gate price less Total Cost as defined in ‘f’.  
h. In the case of the plasma smallholding, this is the total cost including overheads 
of getting the stand up to year 4 when it commences production. Most of this cost 
is repaid at interest by the smallholders concerned, but that could take 6-8 further 
years. In the case of the high-yielding smallholding this is the cost of providing 
the subsidized seedlings and the accompanying extension by the Dinas 
Perkebunan.   
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Table 4. Expected Internal Rates of Return (IRRs) and Net Present Values (NPVs) 
 
  
Estates 
Plasma 
s/holdings 
High-yielding 
s/holdings 
Low-yielding 
s/holdings 
IRR (%) 
  With land cost 
  Without land  
 
18 
20 
 
15 
16 
 
18 
21 
 
12 
19 
NPV (Rp‘000) 
  With land cost 
  Without land 
 
11.852 
15.477 
 
6.066 
9.720 
 
6.975 
10.832 
 
Negative 
4.485 
 
